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Political parties need to act as unitary actors in parliaments to implement their policy goals. The 
literature has acknowledged that candidate selection process is one of the most powerful tools 
for a party to achieve and maintain internal cohesion within the parliamentary group. Political 
parties that do not win election cannot develop their policy goals though. Candidate selection 
processes present thus two – potentially conflicting – objectives: vote-seeking strategy 
(recruiting ‘popular candidates’) and policy-seeking strategy (enlisting ‘party soldiers’). The 
personalization of politics, where electoral campaigns are increasingly personal while eroding 
the role of issues and ideology in voting behaviour, enhances the tensions between parties’ vote-
seeking and policy-seeking strategies. According to some scholars, the former even prevails 
over the other which causes critical consequences for the functioning of parties in legislature 
and the broader democratic political systems. However, in line with more recent development 
in the literature, we argue that personalization is not necessarily a zero-sum game: political 
parties can balance tickets using both strategies. In that configuration, one strategy interacts 
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candidates at the 2014 Belgian elections. Overall, our results prove that vote-seeking strategy 
matters but heavily depends on policy-seeking strategy. It demonstrates that parties use both 
strategies as a trade-off to balance their lists, even though vote-seeking strategy ultimately 
prevails for a substantial number of candidates studied. The results call for a more positive 
normative account of the personalization thesis. The later has the potential to keep voters, 
candidates and parties connected in the representation process. 
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*** Work in progress – Comments very welcome *** 
Introduction 
Political parties need to act as unitary actors in parliaments to implement their policy goals. The 
literature has acknowledged that candidate selection process is one of the most powerful tools 
for a party to achieve and maintain internal cohesion within the parliamentary group (Gallagher 
and Marsh 1988; Hix 2004; Carey 2007; Hazan and Rahat 2010). Before implementing their 
policy programs, political parties need to win seats though. And to gain seats, parties must first 
win votes through the candidates they present. For that reason, candidate selection processes 
present two – potentially conflicting – objectives. Political parties’ need to select electoral 
candidates that enable them (1) to win elections recruiting individuals with vote-earning 
capacity (i.e. vote-seeking strategy with popular candidates); but (2) furthermore need to enlist 
individuals with policy expertise and congruence with the party’s ideology (i.e. policy-seeking 
strategy with party soldiers). Political parties that do not win election cannot implement their 
policies but parties in office without a homogenous parliamentary group cannot reach their 
policy goals either. In open and flexible-list systems, where voters can cast vote for individual 
candidates, this tension increases as parties selectorate responds to voters’ behavior. Hence, 
André et al. (2015:2) states that “[a] preference vote is invariably also a vote for the party. To 
the degree that a candidate’s preference vote-seeking will bring in voters who would not 
otherwise have voted for the party, the party will increase its vote share and possibly gain an 
additional seat […] even at the price of legislative voting unity because breaking ranks with the 
party may help earn votes”.  
These tensions are even more important in context of personalization of politics. 
McAllister (2007 : 585) stated that “personalization of politics will remain a—perhaps the—
central feature of democratic politics in the twenty- first century”. Various scholars have shown 
that electoral campaigns are more candidate-centred while voters increasingly vote for 
individual politicians at the expanse of issues and ideology (although the topic remain heavily 
debated in the literature). “At its core, the personalization hypothesis is primarily based on a 
notion about parliamentary democracy with its traditional emphasis on the role of collective 
and cohesive political parties” (Karvonen, 2010:3). In this respect, the literature on the 
personalization thesis has implicitly or explicitly strong normative claims. The most important, 
in our opinion, is that personalization inescapably entails the erosion of ideology, issues and 
collective identities. In the realm of candidate selection, it implies that personalization would 
lead to the prevalence of candidates’ vote-earning capacity (popular individuals appealing to 
the voters) at the expanse of party soldiers (congruent with the party’s ideology). This has 
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important implication for the parties’ capacity to work as cohesive blocks and, by extension, 
about the functioning of a legislature and of the broader democratic political systems.  
However, different authors have argued that this is not necessarily a zero-sum game 
(Adam and Meier 2010; Karvonen 2007). After all, one candidate can present both virtues: 
being a popular candidate but still a party solider. Furthermore, a balanced list of candidates 
can achieve this dual objective. This requires, however, to study ‘who’ is selected in the first 
place and whether policy preferences and/or vote-earning capacity are influential selection 
criteria. To our knowledge, this has never been systematically investigated on empirical 
grounds before. Our analysis focuses on Belgium where voters’ use of preferential votes has 
been increasing over the last decades while party fragmentation and electoral volatility have 
greatly boosted intra and inter-party competition. Furthermore, combining innovatively 
different datasets (the Belgian candidate survey and the Party leadership surveys), we 
developed a fine-grained measurement of candidate-party congruence at the 2014 elections.  
 The paper is structured as follow. The first section develops the literature review on the 
rationales behind parties’ criteria of candidate selection (vote-seeking and policy-seeking 
strategies). The second section introduces our hypotheses regarding the interactive effect of 
both strategies; the third section details our case study and methodology while the fourth section 
presents the results of our empirical analysis. We conclude on the normative implications of 
our results. 
1. Parties’ criteria in candidate selection: popular candidates and/or party soldiers? 
In representative democracies, two of the core research questions are: who are (s)elected and 
how are they (s)elected (Norris 1997)? The early interest for ‘who’ governs can be explained 
by the impact that the profiles of candidates have on a legislature, and even, on the broader 
sociopolitical system (Dahl 1961; Hibbing 1999; Pitkin 1967). MPs have the power to pass 
legislation and hold the government accountable. Therefore, as Andeweg and Thomassen 
(2010: 655) point out, “[t]he extent to which political parties are unitary actors is crucial both 
for political science and politics”. Carey (2007) identifies three reasons why students of politics 
should care about party unity. First, the most important issues at stake are discussed and voted 
in parliaments, such as the budget, state reforms, international treaties, etc. Second, citizens 
gather information through political parties’ policy stance. When the latter cannot provide a 
certain unity in MPs’ legislative behaviour, citizens cannot rely on political parties’ positions. 
Without parties acting as block, it becomes blurrier for citizens to know who is accountable for. 
The third point raised by Carey (2007) is that non-unity create volatile and uncertain coalitions 
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in the assembly: “[t]he internal cohesion, or party discipline, of political parties must be 
sufficient to enable them to implement their policy program” (Thomassen 1994: : 251).  
Party unity through homogeneity of policy preferences: the party soldiers 
The literature distinguishes different causes that explain variance in party unity, both at the 
macro and micro levels. With regards to macro-level, scholars have underlined the impact of 
several institutional factors (see the extensive literature review of Owens (2003)): electoral 
systems (Bräuninger et al. 2012; Carey and Shugart 1995; Hazan 2003; Sieberer 2006), the 
dichotomy between government v. opposition parties (Laver and Schofield 1998; Laver and 
Shepsle 1996), parties in parliamentary systems v. presidential system (Carey 2007; Diermeier 
and Feddersen 1998a; Shugart 1998), the federal structure (Desposato 2004; Mainwaring 1999), 
or modes of candidate selection (Carey 2007; Cordero and Coller 2015; Diermeier and 
Feddersen 1998b; Katz 1985; Sieberer 2006). With regards to micro-level determinants, 
Özbudun (1970), in his seminal book, identifies two pathways to party unity1.  
On the one hand, parties use (the threat of) sanctions such as de-selection to discipline 
their MPs (see Aldrich (1995) or Cox (1997)). On the other hand, Özbudun (1970) argues, 
parties choose candidates that share similar policy preferences. According to Hazan and Rahat 
(2010: 9): “[c]andidate selection is a key variable in the process of eroding or sustaining party 
unity”. Indeed, the need for sanctions declines when MPs mostly share their party’s preferences. 
As Kam (2009) points out, screening candidates beforehand “allow party leaders to weed out 
candidates with uncongenial preferences” (Kam 2009: : 76). Party cohesion allows parties to 
entrench party unity ex-ante; whereas party discipline comes ex-post, in the assembly. As 
Hazan (2003: 3) states, “discipline starts where cohesion falters”. There is thus a clear incentive 
for the political parties’ selectorates to recruit the ‘good’ parliamentarians ex-ante to limit the 
allocation of costing party resources to discipline MPs ex-poste. As Ranney rightly claimed 
(1981: 103), “[i]t is therefore not surprising that the most vital and hotly contested factional 
disputes in any party are the struggles that take place over the choice of its candidates; for what 
is at stake in such a struggle, as the opposing sides well know, is nothing less than control of 
the core of what the party stands for and does”. 
                                                
1 It should be noted that Andeweg and Thomassen (2010) identifies two other pathways to party unity: party loyalty 
and division of labor. As Ceron (2015b) points out, these pathways are somehow related to party discipline. Party 
loyalty echoes a self-whipping behavior, where MPs somehow follow the party line because there would be a cost 
not to do so. Division of labor also points to party discipline. 
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Selection criteria: the importance of candidates’ vote earning capacity 
This led us to the second question: how are candidates selected? European political parties are 
the gatekeepers of parliamentary offices and candidate selection is one of their defining 
functions (Sartori 1976: 64). The focus on parties’ strategies in candidate selection is therefore 
a central research area for political scientists. In Europe, patterns of legislative recruitment 
reflect long-term processes of transformation of representative institutions that have been 
evolving over the last decades (for cross-sectional and cross-temporal comparison, see (Best 
and Cotta 2000; Borchert and Zeiss 2003; Cotta and Best 2007). Overall, the ‘typical’ profile 
of the selected candidates for parliamentary offices present specific human and political 
capitals. The latter allow parties to recruit individuals with diverse and complementary 
attributes not only to win elections (vote-seeking strategy), but also to implement their policy 
objectives (policy-seeking strategy).  
The importance of a candidate’s vote-earning capacity depends on the electoral systems 
used though. In open-PR systems, votes are merged across all candidates on the same list to 
determine the number of seats allocated to each party. The literature has showed how candidates 
try and distinguish themselves form their co-partisan competitors to access parliamentary office 
(Carey and Shugart 1995). Indeed, voters cannot use ideological or party reputation as decisive 
“cognitive shortcuts” to differentiate candidates running under the same party label (Downs 
1957). Therefore, intra-party competition becomes a critical electoral contest as candidates try 
and mobilize their personal traits and attributes to seduce the electorate2. Flexible-list systems 
are categorized between closed-list and open-list systems (Shugart, 2005: 47). Voters can cast 
their ballot for specific candidates (or for the list approving the order decided by the party), and 
those with the largest preferential votes will be attributed accordingly the seats gained by the 
party (as in open-list systems). Yet, in practice, candidates managing to alter the list’s order are 
rare. Most party seats are allocated following the order candidates appear on the ballot (as in 
closed-list systems) (André et al. 2012; Beblavý and Veselkova 2014; Vandeleene et al. 2016). 
For that reason, the literature often considers flexible-list systems as being quasi closed-list 
systems. Nevertheless, recent studies have showed that flexible-list systems also create 
incentives to cultivate personal vote (Bräuninger et al. 2012). Although a large ratio of 
preferential votes might not affect the list order at t-time, a candidate can still send a clear signal 
                                                
2 This is why “in these systems candidates will run more personal campaigns (Bowler and Farrell, 2011; Zittel, 
2015), and – once elected – will do more constituency service (André and Depauw, 2013; Heitshusen et al., 2005), 
introduce particularized legislation (Crisp et al., 2004), and break from the party ranks more often (Carey, 2009; 
Sieberer, 2006)” (André et al. 2015). 
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to his/her party selectorate about his/her vote-earning capacity for future elections. Preferential 
votes thus matter in flexible-list system and parties pay attention to a candidate’s vote-earning 
capacity despite their low probability of altering the list order. André et al. (2015: 2) explained 
this paradox: “[a] preference vote is invariably also a vote for the party. To the degree that a 
candidate’s preference vote-seeking will bring in voters who would not otherwise have voted 
for the party, the party will increase its vote share and possibly gain an additional seat. There is 
ample evidence that voters’ decision to vote (Adams and Merrill, 2003), as well as the party 
they vote for, can be affected by the candidates on offer (McDermott, 2009; Stone et al., 2010; 
Tavits, 2010)”. 
In closed-list system, allocation of seats between candidates only depends on the order 
predefined by the party selectorate. This is the party leadership that has “virtually unrestricted 
control” over the choice of candidates enrolled on the list (Borchert 2011: 126). Ambitious 
candidates must, therefore, rely on their capacity to convince the party selectorate, not the 
voters. As a consequence, candidates and parties in closed-list systems tend to present a more 
collective and coherent message to the voters vis-à-vis their competitive parties (Kitschelt 
2000). On the opposite, open and flexible list-systems both give incentive for the party 
selectorates to complementary develop vote-seeking strategies. As a result, the parties’ 
selectorates not only need popular candidates who have the capacity to attract voters to their 
party (as voters may not have casted their ballot to that party without such appealing 
candidates); while they furthermore need party soldiers who have the skills, knowledge, and 
ideological preferences to implement the party’s policy programme once in office, i.e. party 
unity (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 9). Hence, candidate selection is a subtle exercise which must 
satisfy potentially conflicting goals. Considering recent structural changes in Western 
democracies, this subtle exerice is under pressure as we develop below. 
Candidates’ vote earning capacity amid time of personalization: popular candidates 
Scholars have argued that politics has become increasingly personalized over the past decades. 
According to (McAllister 2007), “personalization of politics will remain a—perhaps the—
central feature of democratic politics in the twenty-first century”. The personalization thesis 
found its causes in the erosion of traditional partisan cleavages and ideologies in Western 
societies that have become loose determinants of voting behavior for an increasing proportion 
of the electorate (Mazzoleni 2000). Instead, voters respond to short-term electoral conditions 
and political events, causing greater electoral volatility between elections (Dalton et al., 2002). 
We cautiously note that politics has always been about the action of men and women in office 
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(Halldén 1998). Recruiting politicians appealing to the voters is, therefore, inherently part of 
candidate selection processes. According to the seminal contribution of Max Weber, 
charismatic leadership is even one of the pathways to the government’s legitimacy. However, 
the personalization thesis has been arguably enhancing tensions between parties’ vote-seeking 
and policy-seeking goals. 
 Adam and Meier (2010: 216) distinguished two consequences of the personalization 
thesis. On the one hand, the focus on individual candidates and political leaders become more 
important in voters’ decision calculus at the expanse of parties, institutions, or issues. On the 
other hand, processes of personalization make personal, non-political characteristics more 
salient. In this paper, we concentrate most specifically on the first dimension which has 
important normative implications about the functioning of parties and the broader democratic 
system. Indeed, “[a]t its core, the personalization hypothesis is primarily based on a notion 
about parliamentary democracy with its traditional emphasis on the role of collective and 
cohesive political parties” (Karvonen, 2010:3). In this respect, a large body of literature about 
the ‘personalization thesis’ makes – implicitly or explicitly – a key normative claim, namely: 
personalization would automatically entail the erosions of ideology, issues and collective 
identities. In the realm of candidate selection, it implies that personalization would lead to the 
prevalence of popular candidates (appealing to the voters) at the expanse of party soldiers 
(congruent with the party’s ideology). However, as rightly emphasized by Adam and Meier 
(2010: 220): “the process of electoral decision making is not a zero-sum game in which stronger 
candidate orientation necessarily means a loss of the normatively more significant issue and 
party orientation (see also Lass, 1995)”. Likewise, Karvonen (2007) carefully reminded us that 
personalization is not necessarily eroding collective strategies, but rather interacting and 
transforming them.  
Surprisingly, this has not been systematically investigated on empirical grounds. In their 
large literature review of empirical studies, Adam and Meier (2010: 220) show clearly that 
scholars mostly investigate how electoral campaigns, media reporting and commentating or 
voter’s behavior have become more personalized (see also Holtz-Bacha et al. 1998). Yet, only 
one side of the normative assumption of the personalization thesis is assessed (greater emphasis 
on individuals) whereas the decline of ideology is simply assumed or not empirically verified. 
The latter requires an evaluation of ‘who’ is selected in the first place and whether ideological 
preferences remain a decisive selection criterion3. After all, one candidate can present both 
                                                
3 Some scholars of legislative studies investigate how party unity is influenced by cohesion (i.e. internal 
homogeneity of preferences). However, this type of literature suffers from measurement indicator. For instance, 
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virtues: being a popular candidate but still a party solider. Furthermore, a balance of candidates 
on the list can achieve this twofold objective. Some candidates can be more popular but more 
congruent than others and vice-and-versa. In other words the personalization thesis does not 
necessarily entail a zero-sum game but, on the opposite, can produce two main distinct 
outcomes. On the one hand, personalization lead to centered-candidate recruitment pattern 
where policy-seeking strategy has been relegated to a position of secondary importance. This 
affects and transforms parties themselves that are becoming media parties or minimal parties 
(Beyme, 1997; Wiesendah 2001). On the other hand, personalization produce positive effects: 
parties react to process of personalization by paying attention to certain candidates’ traits and 
attributes appealing to the voters (vote-seeking strategy) while they carry on valorizing the 
recruitment of parliamentarians with congruent preferences (policy-seeking strategy). The 
normative implications are important and need to be empirically assessed. To our knowledge, 
this has never been investigated before and this is the research objective of this paper. We 
develop in the next section our hypotheses. 
2. ‘Balancing the ticket’: the interactive effect of party selectorates’ vote-seeking and 
policy-seeking strategies 
When candidates’ vote-earning capacity matters, parties’ necessity to appeal to voters increases. 
As we have seen, this is the case in open and flexible-list systems. Although this strategy maybe 
be fruitful to win elections, it is not without consequence for the parties’ capacity to act as a 
block once in office. This why parties tend to develop ‘mixed’ strategies through a variety of 
candidates. As summarized by Valdini (2006: 57): “the appeal of a balanced ticket to selectors 
is clear - by choosing candidates that belong to a variety of subgroups, party elites achieve two 
of their most important goals. First, they satisfy factions within the party, thereby ensuring their 
continuing commitment. Second, they cheaply and easily broaden the appeal of the list to the 
voters”. Balanced lists reflect the parties’ strategy to adapt and respond to voters’ behaviour 
while complementary achieving their own internal policy goals.  
In this respect, our two hypotheses are based on two assumptions about candidate 
selection processes. Firstly, we consider that party unity is more easily reached before elections 
                                                
some authors proposed to use roll-cast votes as an indicator which is problematic in various way (Spirling and 
Quinn 2010). Not only roll-cast votes are unmistakably high in most European democracies, with limited variance, 
while party unity in roll-cast votes are the result of factors other than cohesion. Other scholars suggested to develop 
content analysis of parliamentary speech (Bäck 2012; Proksch and Slapin 2011) or debates at party congresses 
(Ceron 2015a; Giannetti and Benoit 2009) However, such measurement does not fit our research purposes at they 
present ex-post behavior, except in the Case of debates at party congresses. 
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where parties can screen aspirants to parliamentary offices which reduces the cost of developing 
whipping and sanctions tools once MPs are in office. We thus consider that parties do pay 
attention to candidate-party congruence. Secondly, we argue that not all candidates on a list are 
equal as only a few candidates ultimately manage to access parliamentary office. It is the 
‘realistic positions’ that constitute the real object of dispute in list systems (De Winter 1988). 
We therefore consider that the effect of parties’ strategies are observable between the candidates 
that just fill the list without a realistic prospect of entering the parliament and the candidates 
who have a real chance of accessing office. 
In hypothesis 1, we expect that parties try and maximize the number of votes they can 
gain. A candidate’s vote-earning capacity is, therefore, a decisive asset that increases his/her 
probability to be selected on a realistic position4. In line with the concept of ‘balanced lists’, we 
expect parties to develop a trade-off between votes-seeking and policy-seeking strategies. 
Although a candidate’s vote-earning capacity always has a positive effect to emerge on a 
winnable position, the magnitude of his/her vote-earning capacity varies according to his/her 
congruence with the party. Candidates who are less cohesive with the party’s policy preferences 
must display higher vote-earning capacity to gain access to realistic positions and vice-and-
versa for candidates more congruent. Therefore: 
H1: the marginal effect of candidates’ vote-earning capacity for being selected 
on a realistic position is always positive but decreases as his/her congruence 
with the party’s policy preferences increases. 
In hypothesis 2, we expect parties to complementary recruit candidates that enable them 
to form a sufficiently cohesive parliamentary group. This allows them to reach their policy 
goals (ex-ante) by limiting the need to allocate their resources to discipline their MPs (ex-poste). 
Parties can, however, afford having a proportion of less congruent candidates if this means 
winning more votes. Less congruent candidates still have a chance to be selected on realistic 
positions, but only when they exhibit high vote-earning capacities. In this respect, the effect of 
congruence should be maximal for the least popular candidates and minimal for the most 
popular candidates. In other words, we expect a positive marginal effect of party-candidate 
issue congruence5 which declines as candidates’ vote-earning capacity increases.  
                                                
4 In this paper, we are not interested in the determinants of their electoral popularity per se but rather in how parties 
respond to a known candidate’s vote-earning capacity. 
5 We expect the marginal effect of congruence to be ever positive, as parties have no reason to favour a less 
congruent candidate over a more congruent candidate when they present the same vote-earning capacity.  
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H2: the marginal effect of congruence on being on a realistic position is always 
positive; this effect is, however, the strongest for candidates with lower 
candidates’ vote-earning capacity and declines as this capacity increases. 
3. Data and Methods 
Case study and data 
We test our two hypotheses on the 2014 elections in Belgium for three reasons. Firstly, Belgium 
presents several characteristics of commonly acknowledged determinants of personalization 
(see above). The Belgian party system is amongst the most fragmented in Western Europe 
(attaining 9.1 ‘effective parties’ in 1999, 7.8 in 2014). In combination with its ‘electoral 
consociative features’, this fragmentation boosts party electoral competition (Deschouwer 
2009): since the 1980s, overall aggregate volatility surpassed usually the 10 percent level (De 
Winter et al. 2006). But among individual voters, post-vote shifting between two successive 
elections was about three times higher, with a peak of 41 percent in 2014 (Dassonneville and 
Baudewyns 2014). Secondly, the regional, federal and European elections were organized on 
the same day (for the second time since 1999). Because of the fixed duration of legislative 
terms, they represented key elections as they determined party’s fate for the next five years. 
This meant that parties had to carefully consider – more than ever – the balance between vote-
seeking and policy-seeking strategies. Thirdly, Belgian has a flexible list-system where the 
candidates’ vote-earning capacity matters while the voters’ use of preferential votes have been 
dramatically increasing since WII although it platooned and slightly declined in the early 2010s 
(see figure 1, André et al. 2009; Pilet et al. 2014). Belgium offers a natural empirical ground to 
assess how parties respond to voters’ behaviour. 
Figure 1. Voters’ use of preferential vote in Belgium (1919-2010). 
 
Source: André et al. 2009 
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Finally, from a heuristic viewpoint, the 2014 Belgian elections have seen the 
development of various data collection via the inter-university consortium PartiRep II6. This 
allows the consortium to survey candidates and party leaders on similar statements which 
allowed us to create a direct and reliable indicator of candidate-party congruence (see below). 
The first dataset used is the Belgian Candidates survey (BCS). The BCS includes all candidates 
at the regional, European, and federal elections, covering all parties having obtained at least 
one parliamentary seat in May 2014 (14 parties in total). This population covers 5.254 
candidates from which 1.816 candidates answered the post-electoral questionnaire (i.e. 34.6%) 
(De Winter and Baudewyns 2015). We only used regional and federal candidates due to data 
availability and measurement issues. The second main database includes the party position on 
several policy issues collected via the party leadership survey (PLS) – developed in the 
framework of the Voting Aid Application (VAA)7. This survey was conducted before the 
beginning of the campaign more than two months before Election Day.  
Operationalization of variables 
Realistic Position 
Our depend variable is built on Hazan and Rahat (2011: 13-14)’s basic of realistic positions 
which refers to “all those positions/districts that are seen at least as winnable before the 
elections”8. Our depend variable is a binary indicator which distinguishes candidates’ on 
realistic and unrealistic position on the party list. Hazan and Rahat’s concept is operationalized 
on past electoral results. Because of the strong electoral volatility at the 2014 Belgian elections, 
relying on past results introduce important measurement bias (see Dodeigne (2015)for 
comparison of operationalization of realistic position in case of high volatility). According to 
the various electoral surveys available during the 2014 campaign, it was clear that the Greens 
would not be able to reiterate their exceptional results of the 2009 Walloon regional elections 
while the N-VA would perform much better in Flanders. Candidates and parties anticipate and 
adapt when past unrealistic positions become increasingly realistic. An alternative option is to 
infer realistic positions based on electoral results obtained at election time. It is a fair proxy of 
parties and political observers’ anticipation of their results, as projected during the 2014 
campaign. 
                                                
6 http://www.partirep.eu/, Consulted 10 April 2017. 
7 The francophone parties are CDH, Ecolo, FDF, MR and PS, Flemish parties are CD&V, Groen, N-VA, Open-
VLD, sp.a and Vlaams Belang 
8 On the opposite, unrealistic positions are “positions at the bottom of the list that have no possibility of being 
elected, nor in candidacies in those single-member districts in which rather than selecting candidates, the parties 
simply try to convince someone to stand in their name, with no chance of even giving a good fight”. 
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The allocation of realistic position on the list remains, however, technical. In a first step, 
we allocate realistic positions to candidates according to the party list order. For instance, if a 
party obtained four seats at election time, we consider the first four positions as the realistic 
positions9. The main reason is that preferential votes hardly alter the order of the list (see above). 
Yet, we must consider “list pushers” in Belgium, namely well-know key candidates at the 
bottom of the list. In that case, this position is traditionally treated by candidates and voters as 
realistic positions because of their vote-earning capacity. When there are such “list pushers”, 
the last position must be coded as a realistic position and the other top positions of the list are 
coded according to the remaining number of seats obtained by the party. This is also Put and 
Maddens (2013: 7)’s choice in their study of eligible positions in Belgium. 
Overall, our final dataset contains 13.1 percent of realistic positions (figure 2)10. The 
latter reflects – in similar proportion – the overall availability of realistic positions for the entire 
population at the 2014 elections (5.254 candidates). Furthermore, our depend variable should 
not be considered as presenting rare events (which can bias estimates in logistic regression) 
because of the overall satisfying substantial “absolute” number of observations (129 out of the 
978 observations). 
Figure 2. Proportion of the binary depend variable “realistic position”. 
 
Source: Realistic position based on Dodeigne (2015) 
  
                                                
9 Therefore, a candidate in the fourth position that would not be elected because another candidate makes an 
exceptional score in terms of preferential votes is still coded as a realistic position. The reason is simple: there was 
a clear signal from the party to be selected at a realistic position and the candidate must therefore be coded 
accordingly 
10 The original survey covers 1811 candidates, but missing values for certain variables decrease our final number 
of observations. In the original survey, 12.3 percent of all candidates have realistic positions. 
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Party-candidate issue congruence 
Our first main covariate of interest is the candidate-party congruence. Our operationalization is 
based on two datasets: the BCS and the PLS. On the one hand, in the BCS, candidates had to 
position themselves on 30 policy issues, of which 20 are strictly related to the election level 
they were running for (regional, federal or European). The remaining statements covered issues 
related to the two other levels of government. On the other hand, the same 30 policy issues were 
asked in the PLS for the development of the VAA, for which party leadership had to either 
“agree” or “disagree” on issue statements11. The response modalities in the PLS were different 
as candidates in the BCS could answer the issue statements of a 4-points scale ranging from 
“Totally disagree” to “Totally agree”, no middle category was shown to respondents. The 
BCS’s issue statements were thus recoded into binaries as in the PLS. 
 In addition, we include a weighting parameter for parties’ issue ownership as 
recommended by Rahat (2007) and Traber et al. (2014). Indeed, it is unlikely that parties pay 
attention to all policy issues when screening candidates’ preferences because of parties’ issue 
ownership. As Dolezal et al. (2014) point out, parties tend to emphasize certain issues that, on 
the one hand, are in line with the majority of the electorate and, on the other hand, are owned 
by the party. Therefore, we assume that parties screen most specifically candidates’ congruence 
on their ‘core’ policy issues (Bélanger and Meguid 2008). In a nutshell, policy congruence for 
Green candidates are paramount on environmental issues, but diverging opinion on other issues 
would be more acceptable as they are not their ‘core’ policy issues. Unfortunately, neither the 
PLS nor the BSC surveyed participants on issue ownership. As an alternative, we rely on voters’ 
perceptions of issue ownership (since both candidates and party selectorates respond to their 
behaviour) via the Voter Survey 2014 that was conducted on a representative sample of 2.019 
Walloon and Flemish voters (PartiRep II). We use of the question “Which is the first party that 
spontaneously comes to mind when thinking about that topic?” surveying eight different topics: 
employment, environment, crime, immigration, economy, state reform, defence and taxes. We 
subsequently assigned a weight of party’s issue ownership for each policy statement. Overall, 
our measure of party-candidate issue congruence is estimated as follows: 
 100 ∗ 1 − 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛01 − 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦	𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛01 ∗	4156 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝01𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝014156  
                                                
11 The binary response is justified by the need to identify cleaving issues between parties in order to build the 
VAA. 
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For candidate i and issue statement j. We obtain a measure of issue congruence ranging 
from 0 to 100 percent, where a candidate having a score of 100 indicates a perfect match 
between his/her position and the ones of his/her party. Figure 3 shows that the median candidate 
has a congruence of 75.01 percent (red line on the figure), indicating that our indicator is 
cantered on the right of the axis towards larger congruence. Half of all observations are covered 
between 64.38 and 85.36 percent of congruence (1st and 3rd quartiles illustrated by the dashed 
red lines and the box plot).  
 
Figure 3. Distribution of party-candidate issue congruence (Histogram with boxplot) 
 
 
Candidates’ vote-earning capacity 
The second main covariate of interest is a candidate’s vote-earning capacity. In this respect, we 
cautiously remind the reader that we are not interested in the determinants of their electoral 
popularity per se but rather in how parties respond to it. Relying on past electoral behaviour, 
the parties’ selectorate can directly estimate a candidate’s vote-earning capacity. A 
straightforward conceptualization that comes to mind is, therefore, the percentage of 
preferential votes obtained at the latest elections (the 2009 regional and 2010 federal elections 
in the Belgian case). The main disadvantage is that a substantial number of candidates are 
‘rooky’ candidates (71. 7 percent, which can be explained by electoral reforms prohibiting dual 
candidacies across tiers of government (Dandoy et al. 2015). An operationalisation based on 
former elections would indicate missing values or a null vote-earning capacity. A reliable 
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option is to use the vote-earning capacity at the 2014 elections as a proxy of their popularity at 
the moment of candidate selection procedures. This solution permits to collect preferential 
scores for all candidates but with potentially endogenous measurement. Because both indicators 
have pros and cons, we duplicate the models based former and current elections to produce 
robust models. We used official data provided by the Belgian Minister of Home Affairs: we 
divided the absolute number of preferential votes a candidate received by the absolute number 
of preferential votes gained by the list. This percentage gives candidates’ vote-earning capacity 
for his/her party list. Given the skewed distribution on the left (most candidates obtained a very 
low percentage of preferential votes), we log-transformed the variable (see figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of candidates' log-transformed percentages of preferential votes  




In line with the literature on legislative recruitment, we furthermore controlled for different 
variables relating to human and political capitals as well as structural variables on intra-party 
competition. Variables on human capital include age, gender and education. Variables on 
political capital include rooky candidates as well as former political experience at federal and 
regional levels. Intra-party competition is recorded via variables on effective candidates and 
successor, party magnitude and the effective number of candidates12. Finally, we controlled for 
                                                
12 Effective number of candidates: we need to control for intra-party competition in terms of preferential votes. A 
potential bias is that 10 percent of preferential votes that a candidate obtained on the list are not equivalent across 
lists. For instance, in a list where the 70 percent of all the preferential votes of the list are concentrated on a couple 
of popular candidates, achieving 10 percent is remarkable for a third candidate. On the opposite, on lists where the 
percentages of preferential votes are more equally distributed amongst candidates, 10 percent is not impression as 
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the varying response rate between assemblies and parties. Data was collected via the BCS, the 
Belgian database on political career (Dodeigne 2015) and official data from the Belgian 
Minister of Home Affairs (see summary in table 1). 
Table 1. Summary of the operationalization of the variables 
Variables Operationalization Details 
Dependent variable   
Realistic position on the party list Dummy variable Event= realistic positions 
Main covariates of interest    
Party-candidate congruence Continuous variable 100 percent indicates fully congruent 
Vote-earning capacity at former elections Continuous variable Log-transf. percentages of preferential votes  
Vote-earning capacity at current elections Continuous variable Log-transf. percentages of preferential votes 
Control variables   
Political capital   
Office XP Dummy variable Ref. = No regional or federal XP 
Rookie Dummy variable Ref. = Rookie candidates  
Human capital   
Age Continuous variable Ref. = List without elected officials 
Gender Dummy variable Ref. = Male candidates 
Education Categorical variable Ref. = University degree 
Intra-party competition   
Effective candidates and successor Dummy variable Ref. = Effective candidates 
Effective Nb. of candidates Continuous variable Min 3.3 - Max 41.4 (std 8.4) 
Party magnitude Continuous variable Min 0 - Max 21 (std 4.2) 
Survey response rate   
Parliaments and parties Categorical variable  
 
4. Results 
Before presenting the results of the logit regressions, it is worth underlying that Belgian parties 
did recruit congruent candidate as described in figure 3. The descriptive statistics clearly 
indicate that policy-seeking strategy is present during candidate selection candidate: the median 
candidate has 75 percent of congruence across 30 policy issues (i.e. the histogram is centred 
towards greater cohesion). There is, of course, a substantial variance across candidates which 
enables us to test our two hypotheses and assess how policy-seeking strategy interacts with 
vote-seeking strategy. Results of the logit regressions are presented in table 2. The baseline 
model presents the impact of human and political capitals on the probability of being selected 
                                                
the intra-party competition is less developed (see table 4 in the appendices for illustration). Therefore, we will 
create a measure of the effective number of candidates (ENC) on the list based on the distribution of preferential 
votes between candidates and use it to weight the preferential votes obtained. 
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on a realistic position of the list, the models 2 and 3 present the impact of the interactive effects 
of his/her party congruence and a candidate’s vote-earning capacity based on two types of 
operationalization (at elections time and former elections). The three models present a very high 
model fit with AUC values between 91.3 and 95.8 percent while most of the control variables 
are significant (except for human capital). Furthermore, we observe that including the 
interactive effect substantially improves the model vis-à-vis the baseline model considering the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The latter 
provide “provides a simple, effective, and objective means for the selection of an estimated 
‘best approximating model’ for data analysis and inference” (Burnham and Anderson, 2002: 
3). It measures a trade-off between the quality of fit and the number of parameters in the model, 
lower values indicating better model. The AIC and the BIC’s values show a statistically 
significant improvement with the inclusion of the interactive effects. Parameters in models 2 
and 3 show robust significant findings. For the sake of parsimony, we only present results based 
on the third model that obtained the best AIC and BIC scores.  
 Regarding our first hypothesis (positive effects of vote-earning capacity but increasing 
as congruence decreases), both the individual and interactive terms are significant. As predicted 
by the concept of balanced lists, a candidate’s capacity to bring back votes to the party has a 
statistically significant enhancing effect on the probability of being selected on a realistic 
position. The interactive term being negative, it furthermore indicates that this positive effect, 
however, decreases has the candidate-party congruence increases. In other words, we observe 
that the positive effects of vote-earning capacity are the most important for the least congruence 
candidate. It is still positive and significant for the most congruent candidates but the magnitude 
of the vote-earning capacity’s effect has substantially eroded. This validates our first 
hypothesis.  
Our second hypothesis (positive effects of congruence but declining as popularity 
increases) is also validated. As stated by Brambort et al. (2006), it is possible to have marginal 
effect of our independent variable to be different for substantively relevant values of the 
interactive variable but not for others. Therefore, following the procedure recommended by 
Brambort et al. (2006:74), we plotted the interaction to visualize the conditional effects. Figure 
5 shows (1) how the marginal effect of the vote-earning capacity varies with the degree of 
candidate-party congruence; (2) how the marginal effect of congruence varies with a 
candidate’s vote-earning capacity. The histogram at the bottom of the figure 5 display the 
distribution of observations along the x-axis while the dotted line indicates a null effect of the 
marginal effect. 
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Table 2. Logistic regression on candidate selection on a realistic position of the party list 
  Baseline  Logit Model 
Logit Model 2 
2009-2010 
Logit Model 3 
2014 
Candidate-party congruence  -.06** -.14*** 
  (.03) (.04) 
Vote-earning capacity  2.45*** 6.14*** 
  (.52) (1.05) 
Congruence | Vote-earning capacity  -.02*** -.05*** 
  (.01) (.01) 
Effective nb. of candidates -.06*** -.07*** -.06** 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Party magnitude .18*** .26*** .45*** 
 (.04) (.04) (.06) 
Office XP 2.46*** 2.02*** 1.92*** 
 (.30) (.32) (.34) 
Successors .61** .39 -.86** 
 (.29) (.30) (.37) 
Rookie -2.45***  -2.24*** 
 (.33)  (.37) 
Male candidates .39 .32 .37 
 (.26) (.27) (.30) 
Age -.02** -.03** -.03** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) 
No diploma/primary -.56 -.45 -.14 
 (.83) (.88) (.86) 
Secondary -.71 -.35 -.42 
 (.51) (.52) (.59) 
Higher education -.51 -.44 -.34 
 (.33) (.35) (.39) 
Constant -.57 7.38*** 18.03*** 
  (.66) (2.32) (3.54) 
Survey controls √ √ √ 
    
Observations 982 982 982 
Log Likelihood -226.73 -206.30 -166.89 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 481.46 444.60 367.78 
AUC 91.3 93.2 95.8 
Note:*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. AUC of the ROC: 0.70-0.80 percent indicate a fair model fit, 
0.80-0.90 percent indicate a good model fit, 0.9-1.0 percent indicate an excellent model fit 
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First of all, figure 5 clearly confirms that bringing more preferential votes is always a 
candidate’s strong asset to emerge on a winnable position vis-à-vis other co-partisan aspirants: 
more popular candidate have consistently a greater probability of being selected on a realistic 
position. It furthermore confirms that these effects decrease when the degree of congruence 
increases. In other words, party selectorates can recruit less congruent individuals on strategic 
positions – and sometimes with very limited congruence with their party – if and only if they 
can bring back votes to the list. On the opposite, attracting voters is less important for the most 
congruent candidates. As an illustration, the beta of the variable vote-earning capacity is 4.57 
for the least congruent candidate but only 1.2 for the most congruence candidate. 
Figure 5. Marginal effects of congruence (left) and preferential votes (right) 
 
Note : Data are marginal effects based on the logistic regression presented Table 2. The grey zone indicates 
95% confidence intervals while the histogram at bottom presents the number of observations. 
 
Secondly, figure 5 demonstrates the positive effect of congruence but only for certain 
values of vote-earning capacity. The positive effect stops when the confidence intervals cross 
the zero-dotted line. In other words, H2 is verified but only partially. Although being congruent 
with his/her parties is an advantage vis-à-vis co-partisan competitors during candidate selection, 
it is not the case for candidates who are particularly popular, i.e. when a candidate’s preferential 
votes are between 3.6 and 11.3 percent of the list (which corresponds to log values of 
respectively -3.33 and -2.18 on figure 5). As a matter of fact, 11.3 percent of the list represents 
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a considerable achievement for a candidate as it is a vote-earning capacity five times greater 
than the median candidate at the 2014 elections (2.2 percent). In that case, parties cease to 
integrate candidate’s policy congruence when they recruit their future MPs: all other things 
being equal, the factor that matter most is their vote-earning capacity.  
Table 3. Frequency of observations for marginal effect of congruence and preferential votes 
 Marginal effect of congruence  Marginal effect of preferential votes 








Positive 644 65.8  978 100 
No effect 261 26.7  - - 
Negative 73 7.5  - - 
Total 978 100  978 100 
 
The histogram of observations included at the bottom of the figure 5 permits to put this vote-
seeking strategy in perspective though. Although candidates’ congruence has no effect for 
candidates exceptionally popular, the latter represent ‘only’ a quarter of all candidates studied 
(see table 3). In the meantime, about two thirds of the candidates take benefit of their greater 
congruence. For 7.5 percent of all observations, candidate-party congruence has even a negative 
effect which is puzzling as we expected mere positive effect. Because those 7.5 percent cover 
extremely popular candidates (some managed to concentrate 46.8 percent of all preferential 
votes on the list), the results invite us to proceed to a more qualitative analysis in the future. A 
first intuition here is that the party selectorate are being blinded by their vote-earning capacity: 
the latter led the selectorate to overlook candidate’s congruence which resulted in poor choices 
about candidate’s congruence. Because congruence is systematically negative, this ‘blind’ 
thesis is probably too naïve and unlikely. A second more realistic intuition rests upon the 
strategic behaviour of parties in context of the Belgian high party competition. A new 
hypothesis that should be verified is that the selectorates recruit on purpose a minor proportion 
of candidates who are less congruent on specific policy issues. With limited damage to their 
cohesion as these candidates represent a small proportion of their recruitment, parties can use 
this strategy to send signals of ‘openness’ or ‘renewal’ to non-partisan and/or volatile voters 
(who would not have voted for the party’s core policy otherwise).  
Overall, this strongly confirms that congruence is a strong asset for the large majority 
of candidates but the null and negative effects congruence in some cases – even though it 
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remains limited in proportions of candidates studied – proved that personalization prevails over 
cohesion when candidates demonstrate a larger vote-earning capacity.  
Conclusion 
In their race towards office, political parties must make decisive choices about candidate 
selection’ criteria. While parties need candidates capable of attracting voters, they furthermore 
need political personal with homogenous preferences to implement their policy goals. Without 
electoral gains, no chance of accessing office; and without party unity, fewer prospects for 
implementing public policies. By screening their candidates during selection processes, parties 
have the ability to influence both dimensions using vote-seeking and office-seeking strategies. 
There is, however, quasi inevitable intra-party tensions as the ‘perfect’ list of candidates does 
not exist: some candidates are very popular but less congruent and vice-and-versa. Balancing 
distinct profiles on the lists, parties seek to take the ‘best of the two worlds’: they try and draft 
a list capable of winning elections but also implementing policy goals once in office. In context 
of personalization, this tension is arguably enhanced. Political parties respond to voters’ 
behavior – making increasingly judgement on individuals instead of issues or ideology – which 
would result in vote-seeking strategy prevailing over office-seeking strategy. 
 The consequences of personalization of politics raised, therefore, critical normative 
question for the functioning of parties in legislature and our broader democratic systems. 
However, in this paper we argued that the normative implication of the literature on the 
personalization thesis is more often assumed, than empirically tested. In line with previous 
authors Adam and Meier 2010; Karvonen 2007). We argue that increased candidate-centered 
campaign (producing vote-seeking strategy) does not necessarily lead to less emphasis on issues 
and ideology in the party’s selection criteria (policy-seeking strategy). In other words, this no 
a zero sum-game and personalization rather interact with former parties’ strategies (Adam and 
Meier 2010; Karvonen 2007). 
  To address this gap in the literature, we tested two hypotheses on the probability of 
candidates to be selected on realistic positions at the 2014 Belgian elections. The latter offers a 
heuristic interesting case considering the wide-spread use of preferential votes, and the strong 
party competition in the two Belgian party systems. Furthermore, our innovative use of three 
distinct datasets allowed us to develop a fine-grained measure of candidate-party congruence. 
Our descriptive statistics, firstly, show that the typical median Belgian candidate is substantially 
congruent with 75 percent of convergence on no less than 30 policy issues. Although we do not 
possess previous measurements from past elections to benchmark this percentage, this already 
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indicates that parties do pay attention to policy preference when drafting lists. There is however 
a substantial variance between candidates which allowed us to test how a candidate’s vote-
earning interact with this criterion. 
Our first hypothesis was validated showing that a candidates’ popularity unmistakably 
increased his/her probability to be selected on realistic positions (i.e. the one that virtually give 
automatic access to parliamentary office). However, our results show the least congruent 
aspirants will only be listed high on the list if they display a strong vote-earning capacity. Our 
second hypotheses give, on the opposite, more empirical support to the personalization thesis: 
although congruence matters for most candidates (two thirds of them), it does not make any 
difference to be – more or less – congruent as long as candidates bring back vote the list (one 
quarter of all candidates studied). In some extreme cases (7.5 percent of all candidates), parties 
even seem to recruit purposively candidates that are systematically less in line with party’s main 
ideological stances but who are vote-earning “machines”. Those candidates are capable of 
attracting voters that would not have voted for the party’s main ideological stances otherwise. 
Overall, this proves that vote-seeking strategy matters but highly depend on existing policy-
seeking strategy. It furthermore demonstrates that parties use both strategies as a trade-off to 
balance their lists, even though personalization tends to prevail in some specific cases.  
Overall, even though our empirical findings are based on a single case, this paper 
contributes on two dimensions to the existing literature. On the one hand, fine measurement of 
candidate-congruence show that office-seeking strategy is an important criterion in candidate 
selection processes. Using party leadership surveys (increasingly developed in the framework 
of VAA in various countries) – and associated to existing Comparative candidate surveys – 
scholars of legislative studies and political parties could use more sophisticated and reliable 
indicator than the ones currently being used (see debates in Andeweg and Thomassen 2010; 
Ceron 2015). In some countries, we have the necessary data at our fingertips. This would allow 
us to replicate results on a cross-sectional and cross-longitudinal basis in the future. On the 
other hand, our results have important implications for the functioning of parties, legislatures 
and the broader democratic governanc. Our results presents a positive account of the 
personalization thesis of politics: although it can marginally affect party cohesion, parties 
overall take the ‘best of the two worlds’ balancing their lists. Far from vanishing the saliency 
of issues in politics, personalization of elections allows parties to draft cohesive lists. This has 
the potentially to keep voters, candidates and parties connected in the representation process. 
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Overall, this proves that vote-seeking strategy matters but highly depend on policy-
seeking strategy. It furthermore demonstrates that parties use both strategies as a trade-off to 
balance their lists, even though personalization tends to prevail for about one third of the 
candidates analysed. The results call for a more positive normative account of the 
personalization thesis of politics. Although it can marginally affect party cohesion, parties 
overall take the ‘best of the two worlds’ balancing their tickets. This has the potentially to keep 




Table 4. Illustrative distribution of preferential votes in case of 
 high (List A) and low (List B) concentration of votes between candidates. 
List A  List B 
Candidates 
Percentage of 




pref. votes by 
candidate 
Candidate 1 37%  Candidate 1 18% 
Candidate 2 27%  Candidate 2 13% 
Candidate 3 10%  Candidate 3 11% 
Candidate 4 5%  Candidate 4 9% 
Candidate 5 4%  Candidate 5 10% 
Candidate 6 5%  Candidate 6 10% 
Candidate 7 6%  Candidate 7 8% 
Candidate 8 3%  Candidate 8 8% 
Candidate 9 1%  Candidate 9 6% 
Candidate 10 2%  Candidate 10 7% 
 
 
Figure 6. Model fit of logistic regression (2014) 
 
Note: ROC and AUC estimated based on logistic regression (2014) from table X. AUC value can be 
interpreted as follows: AUC≤ 0.5 useless ; 0.7 ≤ AUC < 0.8 acceptable ; 0.8 ≤ AUC < 0.9 excellent; 
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